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Major step up in carbon capture and storage needed to keep warming below 2 °C
J. Jewell & T. Kazlou. (2024). Major step up in carbon capture and storage needed to keep warming below 2 °C. Nature Climate Change. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-02112-0
J. Jewell & T. Kazlou. (2024). Major step up in carbon capture and storage needed to keep warming below 2 °C. Nature Climate Change 1–2. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-02112-0
A feasibility analysis reveals that carbon capture and storage capacity might be able to expand fast enough to meet the requirements of 2 °C climate pathways but will unlikely meet those for 1.5 °C. Moreover, carbon capture and storage is unlikely to capture and store more than 600 Gt of CO2 over the twenty-first century, which has implications for the global carbon budget.
Feasible deployment of carbon capture and storage and the requirements of climate targets
T. Kazlou, A. Cherp & J. Jewell. (2024). Feasible deployment of carbon capture and storage and the requirements of climate targets. Nature Climate Change. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-02104-0
T. Kazlou, A. Cherp & J. Jewell. (2024). Feasible deployment of carbon capture and storage and the requirements of climate targets. Nature Climate Change 1–9. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-02104-0
Climate change mitigation requires the large-scale deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS). Recent plans indicate an eight-fold increase in CCS capacity by 2030, yet the feasibility of CCS expansion is debated. Using historical growth of CCS and other policy-driven technologies, we show that if plans double between 2023 and 2025 and their failure rates decrease by half, CCS could reach 0.37 GtCO2 yr−1 by 2030—lower than most 1.5 °C pathways but higher than most 2 °C pathways. Staying on-track to 2 °C would require that in 2030–2040 CCS accelerates at least as fast as wind power did in the 2000s, and that after 2040, it grows faster than nuclear power did in the 1970s to 1980s. Only 10% of mitigation pathways meet these feasibility constraints, and virtually all of them depict <600 GtCO2 captured and stored by 2100. Relaxing the constraints by assuming no failures of CCS plans and growth as fast as flue-gas desulfurization would approximately double this amount. Carbon capture and storage is a key component of mitigation scenarios, yet its feasibility is debated. An analysis based on historical trends in policy-driven technologies, current plans and their failure rates shows that a number of 2 °C pathways are feasible, but most 1.5 °C pathways are not.
Have climate policies accelerated energy transitions? Historical evolution of electricity mix in the G7 and the EU compared to net-zero targets
M. Suzuki, J. Jewell & A. Cherp. (2023). Have climate policies accelerated energy transitions? Historical evolution of electricity mix in the G7 and the EU compared to net-zero targets. Energy Research & Social Science. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103281
M. Suzuki, J. Jewell & A. Cherp. (2023). Have climate policies accelerated energy transitions? Historical evolution of electricity mix in the G7 and the EU compared to net-zero targets. Energy Research & Social Science 106, 103281. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103281
Climate policies are often assumed to have significant impacts on the nature and speed of energy transitions. To investigate this hypothesis, we develop an approach to categorise, trace, and compare energy transitions across countries and time periods. We apply this approach to analyse electricity transitions in the G7 and the EU between 1960 and 2022, specifically examining whether and how climate policies altered the transitions beyond historical trends. Additionally, we conduct a feasibility analysis of the required transition in these countries by 2035 to keep the global temperature increase below 1.5°C. We find that climate policies have so far had limited impacts: while they may have influenced the choice of deployed technologies and the type of transitions, they have not accelerated the growth of low-carbon technologies or hastened the decline of fossil fuels. Instead, electricity transitions in the G7 and the EU have strongly correlated with the changes in electricity demand throughout the last six decades. In contrast, meeting the 1.5°C target requires unprecedented supply-centred transitions by 2035 where all G7 countries and the EU must expand low-carbon electricity five times faster and reduce fossil fuels two times faster on average compared to the rates in 2015–2020. This highlights the insufficiency of incremental changes and the need for a radically stronger effort to meet the climate target.
Phases of fossil fuel decline: Diagnostic framework for policy sequencing and feasible transition pathways in resource dependent regions
L. Nacke, A. Cherp, J. Jewell. (2022). Phases of fossil fuel decline: Diagnostic framework for policy sequencing and feasible transition pathways in resource dependent regions. Oxford Open Energy. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ooenergy/oiac002
L. Nacke, A. Cherp, J. Jewell. (2022). Phases of fossil fuel decline: Diagnostic framework for policy sequencing and feasible transition pathways in resource dependent regions. Oxford Open Energy 1. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ooenergy/oiac002
Phasing out fossil fuels requires destabilizing incumbent regimes while protecting vulnerable groups negatively affected by fossil fuel decline. We argue that sequencing destabilization and just transition policies addresses three policy problems: phasing out fossil fuels, transforming affected industries, and ensuring socio-economic recovery in fossil resource-dependent regions. We identify the key mechanisms shaping the evolution of the three systems associated with these policy problems: (i) transformations of technological systems addressed by the socio-technical transitions literature, (ii) responses of firms and industries addressed by the management and business literature and (iii) regional strategies for socio-economic recovery addressed by the regional geography and economics literatures. We then draw on Elinor Ostrom’s approach to synthesize these different bodies of knowledge into a diagnostic tool that enables scholars to identify the phase of decline for each system, within which the nature and importance of different risks to sustained fossil fuel decline varies. The main risk in the first phase is lock-in or persistence of status quo. In the second phase, the main risk is backlash from affected companies and workers. In the third phase, the main risk is regional despondence. We illustrate our diagnostic tool with three empirical cases of phases of coal decline: South Africa (Phase 1), the USA (Phase 2) and the Netherlands (Phase 3). Our review contributes to developing effective policy sequencing for phasing out fossil fuels.
International political economy of nuclear energy
E. Brutschin & J. Jewell. (2018). International political economy of nuclear energy. Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy and Natural Resources. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783475636.00033.
E. Brutschin & J. Jewell. (2018). International political economy of nuclear energy. Andreas Goldthau & Michael F. Keating & Caroline Kuzemko (ed.). Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy and Natural Resources. Chapter 23, 322-341. Edward Elgar Publishing. Gated. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783475636.00033.
The use of nuclear power has been driven by the motivation to meet growing electricity demand while avoiding dependence on imported fossil fuels and constrained by capacities to launch nuclear energy programmes. The chapter argues that tension between the two is a defining feature of the international political economy of nuclear energy. On the one hand, nuclear technology promises energy security and industrial modernisation. On the other hand, launching nuclear programmes can plunge countries into three forms of international dependence: on imported uranium, on production and disposal of nuclear fuel, and on the uneven capacities to manufacture nuclear reactors and construct nuclear power plants. The authors argue that international cooperation and competition profoundly shape how states deploy, expand and phase out their nuclear power programmes and brings together diverse international aspects of nuclear power which may increasingly shape the future of nuclear energy.
Energy pathways for sustainable development
K. Riahi, F. Dentener, D. Gielen, D. Gielen, A. Grubler, J. Jewell, Z. Klimont, V. Krey, D. L. McCollum, S. Pachauri, S. Rao, B. van Ruijven, D. P. van Vuuren & C. Wilson. (2012). Energy Pathways for Sustainable Development. Global Energy Assessment: Toward a Sustainable Future. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793677.023.
K. Riahi, F. Dentener, D. Gielen, D. Gielen, A. Grubler, J. Jewell, Z. Klimont, V. Krey, D. L. McCollum, S. Pachauri, S. Rao, B. van Ruijven, D. P. van Vuuren & C. Wilson. (2012). Energy Pathways for Sustainable Development. Global Energy Assessment: Toward a Sustainable Future, 1205-1306. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Open Access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793677.023.
Chapter 17 explores possible transformational pathways of the future global energy system with the overarching aim of assessing the technological feasibility as well as the economic implications of meeting a range of sustainability objectives simultaneously. As such, it aims at the integration across objectives, and thus goes beyond earlier assessments of the future energy system that have mostly focused on either specific topics or single objectives. Specifically, the chapter assesses technical measures, policies, and related costs and benefits for meeting the objectives that were identified in Chapters 2 to 6, including:
providing almost universal access to affordable clean cooking and electricity for the poor;
limiting air pollution and health damages from energy use;
improving energy security throughout the world; and
limiting climate change.
The assessment of future energy pathways in this chapter shows that it is technically possible to achieve improved energy access, air quality, and energy security simultaneously while avoiding dangerous climate change. In fact, a number of alternative combinations of resources, technologies, and policies are found capable of attaining these objectives. From a large ensemble of possible transformations, three distinct groups of pathways (GEA-Supply, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Efficiency) have been identified and analyzed. Within each group, one pathway has been selected as “illustrative” in order to represent alternative evolutions of the energy system toward sustainable development. The pathway groups, together with the illustrative cases, depict salient branching points for policy implementation and highlight different degrees of freedom and different routes to the sustainability objectives.
Tags
- energy security 15
- feasibility 13
- futures 13
- fossil fuels 12
- coal 11
- Integrated Assessment Models 10
- renewables 10
- climate scenarios 9
- nuclear 8
- context 7
- energy subsidies 5
- theory of energy transitions 5
- China 4
- EU 4
- solar 4
- energy transitions 3
- wind 3
- CCS 2
- Germany 2
- India 2
- international relations 2
- Comparative analysis 1
- G7 1
- Japan 1
- Korea 1
- Middle East 1
- Turkey 1
- climate policy 1